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Recent Cases
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-A CEMETERY AS
A T fTW f' TC)' T I 1- T3T T' A A mrTf"'lT A NT'I%
THE RIGHT OF THE HUMAN RELATIONS
COMMISSION TO ORDER AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA
HUMAN RELATIONS ACT
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Alto Reste Ceme-
tery Park Association, 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973).
In Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Alto Reste
Cemetery Park Association,' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
ruled that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission has the
power to order a party who has violated the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act 2 to take such affirmative action as can fairly be said
to effectuate the policies of the Act.3 In so doing, the court has
departed from Pennsylvania precedent and has joined with other
states in permitting a civil rights board to go beyond merely issuing
cease and desist orders. The court further ruled that a nonsectar-
ian cemetery is a place of public accommodation within the defi-
nition of the Human Relations Act, 4 thereby broadly interpreting
the establishments included within the Human Relations Act. By
its ruling, the court has again departed from precedent and joined
1. 453 Pa. 124, 306 A.2d 881 (1973).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-63 (1964).
3. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto Reste Cemetery
Park Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 134, 306 A.2d 881, 887 (1973). The standard adopted
by the courts was taken from Fibreboard Paper Products v. N.L.R.B., 379
U.S. 203, 216 (1964).
4. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto Reste Cemetery
Park Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 130-31, 306 A.2d 881, 885-86 (1973).
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an increasing number of jurisdictions that have refused to permit
a cemetery to discriminate on the basis of race.
On January 19, 1970, the Human Relations Commission filed a
complaint against the Cemetery Association for failing to inter the
body of Doctor George Walker, a black man. On April 27, 1970, the
Human Relations Commission ordered the Cemetery Association
to perform certain affirmative actions which included: (1) writing
Dr. Walker's widow a public letter of apology, (2) advertising in
the Altoona Mirror that the Cemetery Association would no longer
discriminate, and (3) maintaining written records to document
whether any person was refused burial and the reason for such
refusal. The Cemetery Association appealed the ruling to the com-
monwealth court but discontinued the appeal after an apparent
compromise had been reached. The compromise was later rejected
by the Human Relations Commission 5 whereupon the Cemetery
Association renewed its appeal to the commonwealth court. The
commonwealth court affirmed the Commission's findings,6 but
modified its order so as not to require that the aforementioned
affirmative action be taken, holding such action to be beyond the
scope of authority of the Human Relations Commission.7 The Com-
mission then appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The
supreme court quickly rejected the Cemetery Association's con-
tention that the Human Relations Commission was bound by the
compromise." With two justices dissenting,9 the court ruled that
the Human Relations Commission did indeed have the power to
order the Cemetery Association to advertise that it no longer dis-
criminated and to order the Cemetery Association to maintain
5. Between July 28, 1970, when the supposed compromise took place
and March 21, 1972, when the Human Relations Commission rejected the
compromise, the membership of the Commission substantially changed.
The counsel for the Commission was also replaced. Id. at 141, 306 A.2d
at 890.
6. 7 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 203, 298 A.2d 619 (1972).
7. Id. at 209-10, 298 A.2d at 623.
8. The court held that since the Cemetery Association had not ap-
pealed from an adverse ruling by the commonwealth court, it could not
raise the issue in the supreme court. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. Alto Reste Cemetery Park Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 128, 306 A.2d 881,
884 n.5 (1973).
9. Justice Eagen and Chief Justice Jones dissented on the ground
that the Commission was bound by its compromise with the cemetery: "I
would not permit the Commission to renege on its counsel's agreement. ...
When a citizen is dealing with government through one of its representa-
tives . . he should be entitled to rely on that individual's words. Simple
honesty and fairness permit no less." Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. Alto Reste Cemetery Park Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 142, 306 A.2d
881, 890-91 (1973).
records indicating whether any person was refused 'burial and the
reasons behind such decision. Such action, said the majority,
would effectuate ,the purpose of the Act. The court ruled, how-
ever, that the Cemetery Association could not be compelled to
write a public letter of apology to Dr. Walker's widow because
such action would not effectuate the purpose of the Human Re-
lations Act.10
In order to understand the court's ruling, it is necessary to
investigate previous decisions concerning a cemetery as a place of
public accommodation and the power of the Human Relations Com-
mission. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act provides, "The
term public accommodation means any place that is open to, ac-
cepts or solicits the patronage of the general public, including but
not limited to. . . .""' There follows a listing of fifty-four places
that -are specifically defined to be places of public accommodation.
Cemeteries are not listed.12 Most early decisions that have con-
sidered the question of whether a cemetery is -a place of public
accommodation under statutes similar to the Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act have 'held negatively. 13  The leading case is People
v. Forest Home Cemetery Co. 4 The Supreme Court of Illinois in
that case held:
The act [of 1911] declared that all persons within the juris-
diction of this state shall be entitled to full and equal en-
joyment . . . and the privileges of places of public accom-
modation and amusement including [i.e. railroads, street
cars, hearses]. Cemeteries are not in the same class as the
places which are enumerated. 15
The court further held that the refusal of the cemetery to bury
the decedent did not violate the fourteenth amendment of the
10. Id. at 139, 306 A.2d at 890.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (1964).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (1964) was amended after suit
was filed in Alto Reste to include cemeteries as a place of public accommo-
dation. The Cemetery Association argued that because the legislature had
amended the original Human Relations Act to specifically include cemeter-
ies, by inference cemeteries must not have been included under the original
act. The supreme court rejected this argument, citing Delaney v. Central
Valley Golf Club, 289 N.Y. 577, 578, 43 N.E.2d 716, 717, 38 N.Y.S.2d 108,
110 (1942):
The fact that the legislature immediately amended the statute so
as specifically to include . . . [nonsectarian cemeteries] when ear-
lier language was restricted by judicial decision, shows clearly that
the amendment was intended for clarification. In addition there
is no canon of construction which is authority for a strict construc-
tion of the statute here in question.
But see McDowell v. Good Chevrolet Cadillac, 397 Pa. 237, 245, 154 A.2d
497, 501 (1959).
13. See People v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 258 Il. 36, 101 N.E. 219
(1913); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60
N.W.2d 110 (1953); Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App.
2d 328, 278 P.2d 945 (1955).
14. 258 111. 36, 101 N.E. 219 (1913).
15. Id. at 40, 101 N.E. at 221.
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United States Constitution because the amendment applies only to
acts of the state and not to acts of a corporation or business.16
In more recent cases, however, the courts have 'held that a
cemetery may not discriminate, but they have reached this con-
clusion using a different rationale.17 Spencer v. Flint Memorial
Park Association' s held that a -cemetery was a public place, and
although no statute was violated, a racially restrictive covenant
with respect to burial rights was "unenforceable." 19 The court in
Spencer reasoned that the Supreme Court of the United States
in Shelly v. Kramer20 forbade the enforcement of racially restric-
tive covenants in the use and occupancy of real property. State
courts, therefore, may not give effect to racially restrictive coven-
ants because such action would be contrary to Shelly v. Kramer
and be violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 21 This reasoning is
directly opposite to the view expressed in People v. Forest Home
Cemetery Co.22 and, in fact, the court in Spencer pointedly ques-
tions the findings in Forest Home and its supporting cases.
23
16. See Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 328,
278 P.2d 945 (1955); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245
Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953) (cemetery was not violating a state statute
by refusing to bury a man with 11/16 Indian blood because under the Iowa
statute a private cemetery is not a place of public accommodation).
But see Erickson v. Sunset Memorial Park Ass'n, 259 Minn. 532, 108 N.W.2d
434 (1961) (statute that forbids discrimination in public accommodations
applied to a cemetery plot because it was held to be an interest in real
property).
17. Erickson v. Sunset Memorial Park Ass'n, 259 Minn. 532, 108 N.W.2d
434 (1961); Spencer v. Flint Memorial Park Ass'n, 4 Mich. App. 157, 144
N.W.2d 622 (1966); In re George Washington Memorial Park Ass'n, 57 N.J.
Super. 519, 145 A.2d 665 (App. Div. 1958).
18. 4 Mich. App. 157, 144 N.W.2d 622 (1966).
19. Id. at 163, 144 N.W.2d at 625.
20. 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
21. Spencer v. Flint Memorial Park Ass'n, 4 Mich. App. 157, 163, 144
N.W.2d 622, 626 (1966).
22. 258 11. 36, 101 N.E. 219 (1913).
23. 4 Mich. App. 157, 167, 144 N.W.2d 622, 628 (1966). The court
quoted from Phillips v. Neff, 332 Mich. 389, 59 N.W.2d 158 (1952):
Should the fact that the property involved is a cemetery lot
require a different conclusion from Shelly? We have seen that on
the basis of a difference in the nature of the property interest, there
was no distinction drawn even in Rice [see note 15] and the 're-
strictive covenant-state action' analysis was applied by the court
in reaching its decision. But going further, this question should
be asked: Is a private covenant any less restrictive because it deals
with a cemetery lot or with private property? The answer appears
obvious - No. Is an enforcement by state courts of such private
covenants as to a cemetery lot any less state action than if the cove-
nant dealt with real property? Again the answer should be obvi-
ous - No.
The federal courts have also adopted the view taken in Spen-
cer. The court in Terry v. Elmwood Cemetery2 4 found that a ceme-
tery which refused to bury the body of a black veteran killed in
Vietnam was in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 186625 which
prohibits discrimination in the sale of real property. The court
referred to Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,26 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that private discrimination in the sale
of real estate, as well as "state action," was unlawful. Because
of Jones, the court reasoned that racially restrictive covenants in
"public cemeteries" 27 have become unlawful per se, instead of
merely unenforceable. In dictum, the court held that any decision
prior to Jones that had upheld racially restrictive covenants in the
sale of cemetery plots was obsolete and no longer good law.
28
Before Alto Reste, there were no Pennsylvania cases dealing
specifically with whether a cemetery was a place of public accom-
modation within the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. There-
fore, it is necessary to examine Pennsylvania cases which have
delt with .te Humn Reations Act in analogous situations.
The court in Everett v. Harron29 reasoned that simply because
a type of establishment is not specifically mentioned in the Act does
not mean that it is not encompassed by the Act. The court held that
the Act should not be construed to mean that "only those places thus
mentioned are within the purview of the statute .... The list
does not purport to be exclusive of all other places. '3 0  The court
further held that a swimming pool was a place of public accom-
modation even though it was not enumerated in the statute. It
can thus be inferred that Pennsylvania has refused to permit nar-
row statutory construction to defeat the overall goals of the Human
Relations Act. Lending weight to this conclusion is Common-
wealth Human Relations Comm. v. Loyal Order of Moose Lodge.3 1
In that case, the court held that a restrictive interpretation of
those establishments which constitute places of public accommo-
dation is not favored. Furthermore, the court held that the public
interest in ending discrimination takes precedence over private in-
terests.
32
In sum, the trend in earlier cases, was (1) not to consider
a cemetery a place of public accommodation and (2) to uphold the
24. 307 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
26. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
27. The court held that there are two types of cemeteries, public and
private. "The former class is used by the general community or neighbor-
hood or church, while the latter is used only by a family or small portion
of the community." Terry v. Elmwood Cemetery, 307 F. Supp. 369, 370
(N.D. Ala. 1969).
28. Id. at 376-77.
29. 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
30. Id. at 126-27, 110 A.2d at 385.
31. 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972).
32. Id. at 459, 294 A.2d at 598.
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use of racially restrictive covenants.A3 Later decisions, however,
have held racially restrictive covenants invalid and unlawful as
violating the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.3 4 Even though these later decisions have not declared a ceme-
ry to be a place of public accommodation, they have declared
discrimination in cemeteries illegal. Until Alto Reste, Pennsyl-
vania has had no cases on point, but had given a liberal construc-
tion to the term "place of public accommodation" as used in the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.3 5 The argument that only
places of public accommodation may be considered to fall within
a civil rights statute has also not met with much success.3 6
The court in Alto Reste also ruled that the Pennsylvania Hu-
man Relations Commission could order a party who was violating
the Human Relations Act to take affirmative action to effectuate
the purposes of the Act.3 7 By its ruling the court has expanded
the scope and power of the Human Relations Commission. In order
to understand the change brought about by Alto Reste, it is neces-
sary to examine previous Pennsylvania law concerning the Human
Relations Commission.
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act provides that if
the commission shall find that a respondent has engaged
... in any unlawful discriminatory act as defined by this
Act, the Commission shall state its findings of fact and
shall issue and cause to be served on such respondent an
order requiring respondent to cease and desist from such
discriminatory practice and to take such affirmative action,
including but not limited to [a listing of several actions], as
in the judgment of the Commission will effectuate the pur-
poses of this Act .... 38
Construing this language, Pennsylvania courts have generally held
that the power of the Human Relations Commission is limited in
scope. In Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n. v. Brucker,89
the court said that the Commission was without power to order
a landlord who was guilty of discriminatory renting practices to
notify the Commission whenever an apartment owned by that
landlord became available for rent. The Commission was also un-
able to force the landlord to give -the Commission the names
and addresses of prospective tenants. Judge Caldwell, writing for
33. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
34. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
35. See notes 29 and 31 and accompanying text supra.
36. Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 120 (1963).
37. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964).
39. 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 369 (Dauph. 1970).
the majority, in Brucker, held that such orders by the Commis-
sion
are arbitrary, burdensome, unreasonable and beyond the
power and authority of the Commission as granted in the
[Human Relations] Act. There is nothing in the record
to sustain the Commissions' assertion that [the orders] are
needed to redress the grievances in this case.
40
In Elgart v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n,41 the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court approved the ruling in Bruck-
er. The court refused to elaborate upon its rationale for striking
an order of the Human Relations Commission, stating that there
was no reason to delve into the matter "where reasons so recently
and ably stated by Judge Caldwell [in Brucker] 42 were available.
In contrast to Brucker, there is some Pennsylvania authority
that recognizes a broader grant of authority to the Human Rela-
tions Commission. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
Chester School Dist.43 held that the Human Relations Commission
could order the Chester School District to design a plan that would
end de facto segretation within the school district. In this case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly overruled a much more re-
strictive holding by the superior court.44 As was the case in Alto
Reste, the court cloaked its decision in "action to effectuate the pur-
pose" language: "The canons of statutory construction require that
a statute be read in a manner that will effectuate its purpose.
45
The decision further held that even though de facto segregation is
not mentioned in the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the pur-
pose of the legislature was to end de facto segregation in the schools.
It should thus be the aim of the courts to carry out this purpose.46
Chester School District was the first Pennsylvania case in Which
the deciding court used the "action that can be said to effectuate
the purposes of the Act" test to interpret the power of the Human
Relations Commission. This is the same test applied by the su-
preme court in Alto Reste. Between these two decisions, however,
came Brucker and Elgart and their restrictive view of the power of
the Human Relations Commission. These cases did not apply the
"action to effectuate the purposes ,of the Act" test. Moreover, both
Brucker and Elgart specifically warned against giving the Human
40. Id. at 382.
41. 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 616, 287 A.2d 887 (1972). Here the Hu-
man Relations Commission ordered a discriminating landlord to notify the
Commission for a period of one year each time a vacancy occurred on the
landlord's premises.
42. Id. at 621, 287 A.2d at 890.
43. 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967).
44. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Chester School Dist.,
209 Pa. Super. 37, 224 A.2d 811 (1967).
45. 427 Pa. 157, 166-67, 233 A.2d 290, 295 (1967), accord, Balsbaugh v.
Rowland, 447 Pa. 423, 428, 290 A.2d 85, 90 (1972).
46. 427 Pa. 157, 167, 233 A.2d 290, 295-96 (1967).
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Relations Commission a broad discretionary power.4" Because Penn-
sylvania law dealing with the scope of the Human Relations Com-
mission's power is somewhat confused, it becomes necessary to
investigate how Pennsylvania courts have construed the power of
administrative agencies in the past.
Historically, the Pennsylvania courts have refused to grant
broad authority to administrative agencies. In re Pesognelli's Li-
quor License48 is the leading Pennsylvania decision dealing with the
powers of an administrative agency. The court in Pesognelli, con-
struing the power of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, found
it limited, holding:
An administrative tribunal cannot be given an unlimited
or arbitrary discretion, for to do so would result in a
government of men instead of a government of laws. The
legislature may grant tribunals discretion but the stand-
ards must be limited in scope.
49
Similar statements are common in Pennsylvania cases involving ad-
ministrative agencies.50 The courts will recognize that the legisla-
ture may confer authority and give discretion to an agency and that
all the details of administration do not have to be spelled out.51
The grant of authority, 'however, must contain standards which will
restrain that authority.52 Without ascertainable standards, the ad-
ministrative power is doubtful at best. Thus, in Green v. Milk Con-
trol Comm'n,53 it was held that where a state statute gives an agency
the power to regulate the purchase, sale, and delivery of milk, but
says nothing about consignment, then the Milk Control Commis-
sion has no power to deal with the consignment of milk. The court
stated: "The power and authority to be exercised by an adminis-
trative agency must be conferred by legislative language clear and
unmistakable. A doubtful power does not exist.
' '5 4
47. See notes 36 and 38 and accompanying text supra.
48. 191 Pa. Super. 320, 156 A.2d 540 (1959).
49. Id. at 322-23, 156 A.2d at 541.
50. See Commonwealth v. American Ice Co., 406 Pa. 322, 332, 178 A.2d
768, 773 (1962); Felix v. Pennsylvania Public Relations Comm'n, 187 Pa.
Super. 578, 582, 146 A.2d 347, 349-50 (1959); Sanitary Water Bd. v. Glen
Alden Corp., 83 Dauph. 108, 116 (1964).
51. Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. County Bd. of School Directors,
418 Pa. 520, 529, 211 A.2d 487, 493 (1965); Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal, 389
Pa. 35, 47-48, 131 A.2d 587, 593 (1957).
52. Chartiers Valley Joint Schools v. County Bd. of School Directors,
418 Pa. 520, 529, 211 A.2d 487, 493 (1965).
53. 340 Pa. 1, 16 A.2d 9 (1940).
54. Id. at 2, 16 A.2d at 9. See also 425-29 Inc. Liquor License Case,
179 Pa. Super. 235, 241, 116 A.2d 79, 82 (1955); Hotchkiss Liquor License
Case, 169 Pa. Super. 506, 512, 83 A.2d 398, 400 (1951).
Commonwealth Water and Power Resources Board v. Green
Springs Co.55 adopts a different view. In this case, the court felt
that it would be impossible for the legislature to anticipate all the
various situations that might arise and specifically provide therefor
in a statute. The court concluded that the only way to deal with
the various situations that may arise is to establish general, inten-
tionally vague standards for the administrative -agency to follow.
The particular administrative agency must be vested with the power
to determine the facts in a particular case and to apply a workable
remedy that is within the purposes of the statute.56 Because a
court using this reasoning must look to the purposes of the partic-
ular enabling statutes, it is submitted that this reasoning is in ac-
cord with Alto Reste and indeed could support the conclusions in
that case.
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania has generally granted little discre-
tion to its administrative agencies. The courts have demanded that
the action of the agency be based on clear, unambiguous statutory
language. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission has been
no exception. Thus the greater number of cases that have consid-
ered the issue have held that the power of the Human Relations
Commission is a narrow power based strictly on the Human Re-
lations Act.57  It is significant, however, that the liberal rulings
have almost without exception come from the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court whereas the lower courts have generally held to a
more restrictive view of the power of the Human Relations Com-
mission.58
In order to better understand Pennsylvania's position, it is help-
ful to compare it to the position of New Jersey and New York.
New Jersey, in its civil rights statute59, has empowered the di-
rector of the Division on Human Rights to "take such affirmative
action . . . as in the judgment of the director will effectua-te the
purposes of this Act." 60  This "affirmative action" portion of the
Act is relatively new and consequently the amount of litigation con-
cerning it has not been great. In two cases, however, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court has struck a liberal position concerning the
power of its Division on Human Rights. In Polk v. Cherry Hill
55. 394 Pa. 1, 145 A.2d 178 (1958).
56. Commonwealth Water & Power Resources Bd. v. Green Springs
Co., 394 Pa. 1, 9, 145 A.2d 178, 182-83 (1958), accord, State Bd. of Chiroprac-
tic Examiners v. Life Fellowship of Pa., 441 Pa. 293, 299-300, 272 A.2d 478,
482 (1971).
57. See notes 39 and 41 and accompanying text supra.
58. See Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Loyal Order of
Moose Lodge, 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972); Pennsylvania Human Rela-
tions Comm'n v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967);
Elgart v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
616, 287 A.2d 887 (1972); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
'Brucker, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 369 (Dauph. 1972).
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10 (1966).
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-17 (1966).
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Apartments,"' the majority held that a landlord who was guilty of
discrimination against Negroes in his renting practices could be or-
dered to supply the Division on Human Rights a list of all the apart-
ments that he had available for rent. To justify its decision, the
court found that "the Director of the Division has been given broad
powers to fashion and impose remedies he believes will be effective
to accomplish his mission." 62 Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Jackson v. Concord Co.68 ruled that the posting of signs ad-
vertising the director's ruling was necessary to protect persons who
may be discriminated against in the future. The court stated:
Discrimination by its very nature is directed against an
entire class .... Common knowledge and experience dic-
tate... that an apartment owner found to have discrimin-
ated in one instance may well have discriminated in the
past and plans to discriminate against all others in the
class. So the law seeks not only to give redress to the
individual who complains, but moreover, to eliminate and
prevent all such future conduct ... 61
New York has also enacted a civil rights act 65 that contains an
"affirmative action" clause 6 similar to the one in the Pennsylva-
nia Human Relations Act. Attempts by New York courts to define
permissible affirmative action, ordered by the New York State Di-
vision on Human Rights, are confused. At various times, New York
courts have ruled that the Division on Human Rights could not:
(1) order a landlord to notify an individual against whom he dis-
criminated of all the vacancies he had in apartments owned by the
landlord,67 (2) force a landlord to apply the same rental standards,
now and forever, to all prospective tenants, 8 (3) command a lessor
of commercial space to list all the space he had available for rent,69
and (4) order a landlord to give preference to referred tenants.
70
On the other hand, the New York courts have ruled that the Divi-
61. 62 N.J. 55, 298 A.2d 68 (1972).
62. Id. at 58, 298 A.2d at 69.
63. 54 N.J. 113, 253 A.2d 793 (1969).
64. Id. at 121, 253 A.2d at 799. See David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301,
327, 212 A.2d 345, 359 (1965); Robinson v. Branch Brook Manor Apartments,
101 N.J. Super. 125, 132, 243 A.2d 284, 288 (App. Div. 1968).
65. N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-99 (McKinney 1972).
66. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(4) (c) (McKinney 1972).
67. Italiano v. New York State Executive Dept., Div. of Human Rights,
36 App. Div. 2d 1009, 1013, 321 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425 (1971).
68. Moskal v. State Executive Dept., Div. of Human Rights, 36 App.
Div. 2d 46, 53, 319 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (1971).
69. New York State Comm'n of Human Rights v. Landau Indus., 57
Misc. 2d 918, 925, 293 N.Y.S.2d 917, 921 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
70. Italiano v. New York State Executive Dept., Div. of Human Rights,
36 App. Div. 1009, 1013, 321 N.Y.S.2d 422, 425 (1971).
sion on Human Rights had the power: (1) to force an employment
agency not to accept applicants, employees, and referals where dis-
crimination might be a factor,7 ' (2) to rule that a landlord must
notify a prospective tenant of the first apartment that becomes
available,7 2 and (3) to order the maintenance of a list of applicants
for apartments and the reasons that any applicant is refused an
apartment.73 Each of these decisions was written as a response to a
single fact situation. There was little concern for formulating
a rule that would generally define permissible standards of affirm-
ative action that the New York Division on Human Rights might
order.
By comparison with the rulings in New Jersey and New York,
Pennsylvania ,has adopted a relatively narrow view of the power of
its Human Relations Commission. Although New York law is
somewhat confused, a significant number of New York courts have
allowed the Division on Civil Rights a great deal of latitude in its
operation. Similarly, New Jersey has consistently allowed its civil
rights board to take action that would effectuate the purpose of its
Civil Rights Act.7 4 It is submitted that Pennsylvania, if it is also to
adopt the "action to effectuate the purpose of the Act" standard, can
gain valuable insight as to the workability of such a standard by
examining the decisions in New York and New Jersey.
Alto Reste considerably alters Pennsylvania law. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has greatly enlarged the scope and power of
the Human Relations Commission. First, the Commission is no
longer bound by a restrictive list of statutorily enumerated estab-
lishments 75 -as the only places of public accommodation. The court
has interpreted the public accommodations section of the Human
Relations Act broadly, holding that -an establishment is a place of
public accommodation if it "is open to, accepts or solicits the patron-
age of the general public."7 6 Furthermore, the Human Relations
Commission may now fashion different remedies to fit different
fact situations. By requiring periodic reports, the Commission can
ensure that an offending party will not discriminate in the future.
Perhaps, the most important contribution of Alto Reste is its articu-
lation of a standard for action that can 'be ordered by the Commis-
sion, i.e., any action that effectuates the purpose of the Human Re-
lations Act is permissible under the ruling in Alto Reste.
71. Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 46, 119 N.E.2d 581, 585, 122 N.Y.S.
2d 721, 727 (1953).
72. State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Liebner, 29 App. Div. 2d 663,
667, 286 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (1968).
73. Moskal v. State Executive Dept., Div. of Human Rights, 36 App.
Div. 2d 46, 54, 319 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (1971).
74. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (1970).
76. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto Reste Cemetery
Park Ass'n, 453 Pa. 124, 131, 306 A.2d 881, 886 (1973).
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The future effect of Alto Reste will be to permit the Pennsyl-
vania Human Relations Commission greater effectiveness to deal
with discrimination. Narrow legal arguments will no longer be ef-
fective to defeat the purposes of the Human Relations Act. The
thrust of Alto Reste is to support a ruling of the Commission un-
less the ruling could be found to violate a specific section of the Hu-
man Relations Act. In the future, the courts may give the Commis-
sion a quasi-judicial function. Its job may be to seek out discrimin-
ation and use notions of justice and fair play to determine its rem-
edies in much the same way as a court of equity.
BARTHOLOMEW J. DELUCA, JR.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TWO ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
CREATED BY THE 1971 AMENDMENT TO THE FOOD
STAMP ACT RULED UNJUSTIFIABLY
DISCRIMINATORY AND VIOLATIVE
OF DUE PROCESS
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973); United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S.
508 (1973).
Despite America's affluence and high standard of living, hunger
born of poverty exists among a sizeable minority of the nation's
population. In recognition of this fact, and in acknowledgement of
the need to provide basic levels of nutrition for all Americans, Con-
gress promulgated the Food Stamp Act of 1964.1 There is a
sufficient abundance of food in America to properly nourish the
entire nation.2 The Congress has recognized that low income fami-
lies can suffer from poor nutrition and hunger because of their
economic 'status and has decided that all governmental agencies,
from the federal level to the local, should cooperate in utilizing
this abundance to raise the nutritional levels of low income fami-
lies.' To this end, the Food Stamp Program was established to
"permit low income families to purchase a nutritionally adequate
diet through normal channels of trade.
'4
From a participant's point of view, the mechanics of the pro-
gram are uncomplicated, and of course, extremely beneficial. In
accordance with regulations established by the Act 5 a candidate
must establish that his income level is a substantial limiting fac-
tor in his ability to purchase foods necessary for an adequate diet.6
Once declared eligible, he may purchase food stamps for much less
than face value, but may redeem them at face value 7 by purchas-
ing food8 at approved stores," thereby supplementing his income.
1. Act of August 31, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, §§ 1-16, 78 Stat. 703
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2025 (1964)) [hereinafter cited as the Food
Stamp Act]. See generally Annot., 13 A.L.R. Fed. 369 (1972).
2. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1964).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2019(c) (1964).
6. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a) (1964).
7. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2015(a), 2016(b) (1964); 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1964).
8. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(b) (1964) for the Act's definition of 'food.'
9. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(b) (1964).
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In 1971, Congress amended the Food Stamp Act 0 changing,
among other things, the eligibility standards. The companion
cases United States Department of Agriculture v. Morena"' and Unit-
ed States Department of Agriculture v. Murry1" involve two of the
alterations in the standards of eligibility.
In order to assure themselves that their intent shall be ful-
filled, legislatures often include a lexicon at the beginning of a
statute containing definitions of key words which are to be used in
construing the statute.13 Such a key word in the Food Stamp
Act is 'household ' 14 as it signifies the basic unit which partici-
pates in the program. 15 Under the 1971 amendment, a household
eligible to participate in the program could consist only of related
persons or non-related persons older than 60, who are not resi-
dents of an institution or boarding house and who live as an eco-
nomic unit.16 Merely having one unrelated person under 60 in a
household causes it to be ineligible for food stamps. This stringent
definition, and the eligibility criterion considered by the Court
in Morena are an expression of the alarm felt by the legislators at
the unfair advantage some persons were taking of the program,
7
and were intended to provide a mechanism whereby systematic
abuses could be curbed.' 8 According to the definition, any house-
hold, which for any reason contains an unrelated person, is pro-
hibited from participating in the Food Stamp Program.'9 A group
10. Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671, §§ 1-7, 84 Stat. 2048, 2048-
52 amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-14, 2016, 2023-25 (1964) (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-26 (1970)).
11. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
12. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
13. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (1970) for the lexicon of the Food Stamp Act.
14. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970).
15. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014, 2019 (1964).
16. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970). They must purchase food as a unit and
share cooking facilities whether related or unrelated. Single persons living
alone and cooking for themselves are specifically included as "households."
Id.
17. "We have had cases called to our attention of college students, chil-
dren of wealthy parents, receiving food stamps. I do not believe it was
the intention of Congress to provide food stamps at taxpayers' expense, for
college students of wealthy parents." 116 CONG. REC. 41979 (1970) (re-
marks of Congressman Latta). College fraternities and "hippie" communes
are examples of those who were not among the group Congress intended
to benefit by this federal welfare legislation. Id. at 42003.
18. See 116 CoNG. REC. 41979-81, 41981-42036 (1970).
19. For example, where an indigent family of four live with an unre-
lated indigent, the entire household is ineligible for food stamps irrespective
of the fact that the only source of income in the household is (woefully in-
adequate) public assistance. Or where a young girl who attends a school
for the deaf must live with another woman because it is the only economi-
cally viable way to attend the school (due to greatly limited financial re-
of persons thus affected are the appellees in United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno. 0
A statutory classification is created by the definition of 'house-
hold' as it appeared in the amendment.21 Households in which ev-
ery member is related were classified as being eligible and house-
holds which had one or more unrelated members under 60 where
classified as being ineligible, without consideration of any other
fact. It is this classification which the Moreno court considers,
and finds violative of fifth amendment due process.2
The harm suffered by the appellees (and those in analogous
situations) is self evident: they were deprived of an essential
means of survival. Despite this harm, the government defended
the classificatory scheme brought into question by Moreno, claim-
ing that it was related to a legitimate government interest, i.e.,
minimizing fraud in the administration of the Food Stamp Pro-
gram. 23 The government reasoned that unrelated households (ei-
ther entirely unrelated, or containing some subgroup of unrelated
persons) are more likely to resort to fraud, by failing to report
income or by remaining poor voluntarily, than a true nuclear fam-
ily group. The government also hoped to buttress this reasoning
by observing that unrelated households may tend to be unstable,
making abuses difficult to detect.
As the Court indicates, 24 this argument ignores several things.
Clearly, if it were economically possible, eligibility could be easily
regained merely by altering living arrangements; no fraud (if fraud
is being perpetrated) having been arrested. Furthermore, the Act
itself has other provisions designed to eliminate fraud 25 and vol-
untary poorness. 26 Contrary to the designs of Congress,
in practical operation, the 1971 Amendment excludes from
participation not these persons who are 'likely to abuse
the program,' but rather only those persons who are so
desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford
to alter their living arrangements so as to retain eligibil-
ity.27
sources), food stamps are not available to them as long as they live to-
gether. These, and other persons thus affected are the appellees in U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 531-32 (1973).
20. Plaintiffs, five groups of persons, brought a class action against
the Department of Agriculture, the Secretary of Agriculture, and two other
Department officials to enjoin enforcement of the definition of 'household'.
A district court judge sitting alone granted declaratory and injunctive re-
lief. A three judge district court was then convened, where a separate
declaratory judgment invalidated 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) and enjoined it's en-
forcement. 345 F. Supp. (D.D.C. 1972). The Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction at 409 U.S. 1036 (1972).
21. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970).
22. 413 U.S. 528, 532-38 (1973).
23. Id. at 535.
24. Id. at 534-38.
25. 7 U.S.C. § 2023(b), (c) (1964).
26. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1964).
27. 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
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The Court found no reason to believe that the classification could
actually eliminate fraud.28 Instead, it was found to discriminate
against persons who legitimately depend upon the program by
rendering them ineligible to participate. In fact, the classification
works against the declared purpose of the Food Stamp Act by
preventing needy persons from receiving aid.23 Thus, as the classi-
fication did not effectuate the purpose of the Act and improperly
discriminated against some individuals, the classification was called
into question.
The Court found two major deficiencies inherent in the classi-
fication. First, a legislative classification must be sustained if
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.3 0 Clearly,
elimination of fraud in a federal assistance program (such as the
Food Stamp Act) is a legitimate government interest; the pur-
poseful elimination of "hippies" is notA1 When the classification
itself does not reasonably relate to the purpose of the statute, i.e.,
the defining characteristic on the statute's face bears no relation
to the statute's purpose, the classification is arbitrary, 32 and an
arbitrary classification is void.3  As previously noted,34 the re-
related/non-related classificatory scheme was to eliminate fraud, but
this purpose was not accomplished. The classification was there-
fore considered arbitrarily as being without a rational basis.36
28. "[T]he challenged classification simply does not operate so as ra-
tionally to further the prevention of fraud." Id. at 537.
29. Id. at 534. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
30. 413 U.S. 528, 533. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535,
546 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1972); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1969). Cf. Hutardo v. United States, 410 U.S. 578,
591 (1973). See generally M. FoRBoscH, CoNsTITuTIONAL LAW 519-27 (2d
ed. 1969); S. WFAvR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 379-
404 (1946).
31. The Court refers to the legislative intent behind the 1971 amend-
ment (getting hippies off federal welfare) and says,
The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by refer-
ence to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional con-
ception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate govern-
mental interest.
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). See notes 2-4, 17, 18 and accompanying text supra.
32. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
33. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); Allied Stores, Inc.
v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Nichol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 521 (1899). Cf.,
e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1972). See generally M. FoR-
BOSCH, CoNsTrruTiONAL LAW 519-27 (2d ed. 1969); 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 343-
56 (1949).
34. See notes 18 and 28 and accompanying text supra.
35. 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
Secondly, there are certain standards which equal protection
demands of a classificiation: if legislation creates a class, it must
apply equally to those in the class.8 6 A classic statement of this
requirement is found in F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia.37
[T] he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and
must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.
37a
Immediately the question arises: what is indicative of being "simi-
larly situated?" The mere fact of having been placed in a class cre-
ated by a statute entails being classified, that is, having some char-
acteristic or other which defines the person as being a member of
that class. Ideally the only people who have the defining charac-
teristic are those who are similarly situated with respect to the pur-
pose of the law. It then follows that the test of the reasonableness
of a classification must be whether it includes all persons similarly
situated to the purpose of the statute.,'
Problems arise when the class created by the defining charac-
teristic in the statute is not identical to the class of persons simi-
larly situated to the purpose of the statute. Overinclusion 9 in a
class occurs when the defining characteristic includes other than
those similarly situated to the purpose of the statute.40 The effect
of overinclusion is the unjustifiable application of the statute to
persons with whom the legislature had no intent to deal.4 If a per-
36. Tussman & tenrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF'.
L. REv. 341, 344-45 (1949). For example, a military order whose purpose
was to restrict the activities of potential sabateurs or espionage agents was
overinclusive when it was applied to all persons of Japanese descent as
only a portion of that class posed such a threat. Id. at 346. As to the
question of federal equal protection, see notes 46-47 and accompanying text
infra.
37. 233 U.S. 412 (1920).
37a. Id. at 415.
38. Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 341, 346 (1949).
39. Underinclusion is not germane to this discussion. See Comment,
Developments-Equal Protection, 82 HAMv. L. REv. 1065, 1084-86 (1967) and
Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341, 348-51 (1949) for a discussion of underinclusion.
40. Comment, Developments-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065,
1086 (1969).
41. Of course, the statute may work to benefit those whom it classi-
fies, and persons overincluded will not complain, but this is not the case
in the situation at hand. Clearly, people who are not defrauders are not
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the classification as de-
frauders are. It is interesting to note that the Court chose this route over
another, perhaps easier one, viz. "dissimilar treatment for those similarly
situated" as working in a discriminatory fashion. See, e.g., Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 667 (1973). Here, people similarly situated with re-
spect to need and other eligibility requirements are classified differently
because of unrelated persons in the household: both groups are obviously
similarly situated with respect to the entire act. This may be accounted
for by the recent trend toward sustaining underinclusive classifications.





son happens to have the defining characteristic but is not simi-
larly situated to the purpose of the statute, he receives wrongfully
discriminatory treatment when his behavior and relations are im-
properly regulated by the statute. When a classification works
discriminatively, that is, when it causes a statute to operate against
those who are not similarly situated, it is void for want of equal
protection.
42
Expanding upon this second argument, the Court found that
the classification entailed "heinous discrimination violative of due
process. '43 While it has been denied that the fifth amendment
to the Constitution affords equal protection,44 there has been a
trend towards finding an implied equal protection guarantee un-
der fifth amendment due process. 45 The Court, in Moreno, does not
categorically declare that the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment is equally operant under the fifth amendment,
but it does endorse with approval the district court's finding that
"§ [2012 (e)] creates an irrational classification in violation of the
equal protection component of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment."4 6 Employing "traditional equal protection analysis" '4 7
42. See Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1889); Soon
Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885). Cf. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128,
142 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971); Hustin v. Thomas Colliery
Co., 260 U.S. 245, 257 (1922).
43. 413 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1973). See note 46 and accompanying text
infra.
44. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943); Helvering
v. Lerner Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463, 468 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 400 (1940). Cf. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14
(1939).
45. Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 AL-
BANY L. Rsv. 210, 219-22 (1969).
46. 413 U.S. 528, 532-33 (1973) (emphasis added). The fifth and four-
teenth amendments have different applications; the fifth to the federal gov-
ernment, and the fourteenth to state governments. Of the two, only the
fourteenth has words which explicitly grant equal protection. U.S. CONST.
amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § (1). Strictly, there is no guarantee
against discriminatory legislation by Congress. But the Court, reviewing
federal legislation, has had occasion to find an apparent equivalent. In
1954, racial discrimination in D.C. schools was declared unconstitutional in
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In holding that this discrimination
violated due process under the fifth amendment (legislation for D.C. is
promulgated by Congress) the court distinguished between due process and
equal protection, saying that the latter is a more explicit safeguard against
discrimination than the former and that the two concepts are not inter-
changeable. But, more importantly, the Court also said the two concepts
are not mutually exclusive, and that a discrimination may be so unjustifia-
ble so as to be violative of due process. Id. at 499. See also Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943). This type of formula has since been used by the Court.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377
the Court is able to find that the classification causes unjustifiable
discrimination such as is forbidden by due process. 48  Upon the
determination that the classification is proscribed by the fifth
amendment, the statutory scheme which generated the classification
must fall and the Moreno court declares the related household
criterion unconstitutional.
4
In addition to the "related household" eligibility criterion,
which was struck down by Moreno, the 1971 amendment to the
Food Stamp Act 50 attempted to ensure that certain people who
U.S. 163 (1964); 413 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1973). For a partial compilation and
discussion of existing case law as to equal protection and the fifth amend-
ment, see Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Federal Welfare Assistance,
31 ALBANY L. REv. 210, 219-22 (1969). Fourteenth amendment analysis is
obviously a "natural" for finding the requisite "unjustifiable discrimination"
which, once found, can be proscribed by fifth amendment due process.
47. The Court uses the term 'traditional equal protection analysis'
twice: once when it sets forth the premise that a classification must be
sustained if rationally related to a legitimate government interest, and again
in its summation and holding. See notes 22, 29-31 and accompanying text
supra. Traditional equal protection analysis involves scrutinizing a classifi-
cation created by statute to see if there is a rational basis for that class
being singled out, and if so, whether all persons thus singled out receive
equal treatment at the hands of the statute. See M. FoRBoscH, CONSTu-
TIONAL LAw 513-22 (2d ed. 1969); notes 36-42 and accompanying text supra.
'Equal protection' is not used descriptively as the Court is making a fifth
amendment decision. See note 46 supra. For historical development and
analysis of equal protection see Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Protection
of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949); Developments-Equal Protection,
82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding
of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950).
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion goes in quite another direction.
The opinion begins much the same as the Court's, saying the dichotomy
of related and in need versus unrelated and in need bears no rational rela-
tionship to legitimate governmental purposes and is violative of equal pro-
tection/due process. The new analysis begins by observing that the "unre-
lated" eligibility criterion is not directed towards maintenance of nuclear
family groups, but is to keep undesirables off food stamps. Furthermore,
it penalizes the poor who must group together. It is to these households
that the argument is directed: living together is an assembly of sorts, and
the banding together for the purpose of economic viability is as legitimate
an assembly of persons as, for example, a convention. N.A.A.C.P. v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), is cited for authority that associations to
advance beliefs or ideas are entitled to fourteenth amendment due process
protection (the fourteenth amendment incorporating the first amendment
right to assemble). The crux of the argument, and it's novelty lie in this
analogy: indigents who live together for economic purposes form a bona
fide association which is protected by the first amendment. There is no
doubt that there is a "wide spectrum of types of associations" protected
by the first amendment. 413 U.S. 528, 545 (1973). If it is agreed that the
results achieved dealing with the N.A.A.C.P. and similar associations are
applicable to a physical banding together for common purpose, then groups
formed for economic viability fall within that spectrum. Therefore, the
classification in question in Moreno, since it interferes with "associational
rights which lie within the penumbra of the First Amendment," is unconsti-
tutional. 413 U.S. 528, 544 (1973).
48. See note 46 supra.
49. 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973).
50. Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671, §§ 1-7, 84 Stat. 2048, 2048-
51 amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-14, 2016, 2019, 2023-25 (1964) (codified at 7
U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1970)).
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had been taking advantage of the Food Stamp Program51 were
struck from the federal welfare roles by changing the eligibility
criterion. The change proscribed participation in the program by
individuals over eighteen who were claimed as a tax dependent by
a taxpayer who was himself ineligible to receive food stamps.52
Households, rather than individuals are the basic unit of participa-
tion in the program so ineligibility is couched in terms of house-
holds. Households containing such a tax dependent were declared
ineligible regardless of whether the individual was living by him-
self or with others. The household became ineligible during the
year in which dependency was claimed, and also during the follow-
ing year.58
One way a legislative body can ensure the result they wish
is by using presumptions in the applicability criteria of a statute.
If the desired result is that a statute apply only to persons of Class
A and X is a quality characteristic of nonmembers of A, persons
with X are conclusively presumed not to be in A and are ex-
cluded from the subject matter of the statute. Clearly, such pre-
sumptions are handy since they dispose with the need for fact
finding; merely look for the characteristic and determine a per-
son's status under the statute by the characteristic's absence or
presence.
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,54 the
Court found that this criterion of eligibility creates an irrebuttable
presumption of lack of need.5 5 An individual may claim another as
51. 413 U.S. 508 (1973). See note 17 supra.
52. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970).
53. As tax returns are generally filed in "tax year plus one," rendering
a person ineligible in the year dependency was claimed could have no ef-
fect, hence the "following year" provision exists to give the ineligibility cri-
terion practical effect.
54. 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
55. That 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970) creates a presumption of lack of
need may be shown by the well known logical relation of transitivity: if
B follows from A and C follows from B, then C follows from A. (In what
follows, 'person' is substituted for 'household' for ease of explication.) The
initial premise is provided by 7 U.S.C. § 2014(a): "a person is eligible if
and only if he is needy" which is equivalent to "if a person is eligible then
he is needy and if a person is needy then he is eligible." The second prem-
ise is provided by 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b): "If a person has tax dependent sta-
tus, then he is ineligible." The conjuncts of a true conjunction are both
true and may be divorced to be used separately, so we may use "if a person
is needy then he is eligible," which is equivalent to "if a person is not eligi-
ble, then he is not needy." When we employ transitivity, the result is:
"if a person has tax dependent status, he is not eligible," and "if a person
is not eligible, then he is not needy," therefore "if a person has tax depend-
a tax dependent if half support is provided the latter.5 Ostensibly,
if one is claimed as a tax dependent by a non-indigent then he has
received sufficient financial resources to place him out of the class
of needy individuals for whom the Food Stamp Program was pro-
mulgated. 'Ostensibly' is used advisedly as "tax dependent status" is
the fact upon which the presumption of at least minimal solvency is
based. The effect of the presumption is to render ineligible every-
one over eighteen who has tax dependent status, and it is obvious
that this class is larger than the one Congress wished to reach.
Again, as in Moreno,57 persons who legitimately relied upon the pro-
gram, and were in fact intended to benefit from it were disqualified.
The problem presented in Murry is further compounded by the dis-
qualification not only of the individual claimed as a dependent, but
also his entire household. Thus, the households of "hippies" and
college students are not the only ones declared ineligible: the pre-
surpation carries along many others which would have been eligi-
ble due to actual indigency.58 All the appellees in Murry foundJl 1Al_ l'_ 11_ ,1 . 4 . . J1.
nemseives in e econouicslly peiilus positi ofIiu u. wl-u i i-
out the program's assistance merely because their households con-
tained a person over eighteen who had been claimed as a depend-
ent by a non-indigent taxpayer.
59
The Court, in Murry, looked at this eligibility criterion and
found a want of due process.60 The problem encountered in Murry
involves the very nature of a conclusive presumption, i.e., if prop-
erly employed, no hearing with respect to facts is necessary.6 ' In
order to be valid, such a presumption must rest upon some reason-
ent status, then he is not needy." A presumption of lack of need is thus
created by the "tax dependent status" eligibility criterion. Further, the pre-
sumption is irrebuttable as there is no way to challenge the result of the
presumption. See note 90 and accompanying text iura.
56. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 151(e), 152(a).
57. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
58. Even if the ineligible person were minimally solvent, it is difficult
to believe that his entire household is thereby adequately fed (if the house-
hold consists of more than one person). Congress' intent is not clear here.
59. For example, a woman who lives with her sons and ten grandchil-
dren and whose only income is a small monthly alimony payment from
her ex-husband is denied eligibility because her ex-husband claims their
nineteen year old son as a dependent. Or take the case of the woman who
lives with her five sons and whose entire monthly income is $23 (derived
from public support): she is deemed ineligible because her husband (who
deserted her) claims her eighteen and twenty year old sons as dependents.
And there is the married eighteen year old who has a child and whose
monthly income from his job is $110 but is ineligible because his father,
who provides no support, claimed him as a dependent. Descriptions of the
other appellees may be found at 413 U.S. 508, 509-11 (1973).
60. Id. at 514.
61. Due to the fact that the validity of a presumption is rooted in the
self-evidency of the presumed fact from the existence of the demonstrated
fact, reason and experience make proof of the presumed fact unnecessary.
See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EvWDENCE In TRAlS AT COMMON LAw 2490-93
(1940); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVxDENcE 342-44 (2d ed. 1972).
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able basis. 2 Therefore, the presumption itself must be closely ex-
amined to determine if there is rational basis for the presumption
because
a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there
be no rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed if the inference of the one from
the proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of con-
nection between the two.... 3
The Court has held many times, in many divergent sets of circum-
stances, that in order to be valid a presumption must be well
founded and not work arbitrarily.0 4 The true test is whether the
fact presumed most always follows the fact proven (or given).
When it can be shown that the fact presumed is often contrary
to reality or that it works invidiously, the presumption must
be abandoned as unreasonable since it doesn't fulfill its function.
In the instant case, it certainly is not clear how being claimed as a
tax dependent resolves the question of indigency, especially when
the essential issue is the indigency of a household other than the
one to which the individual who is to be declared ineligible be-
longs.6 5
It is obvious that the "tax dependency eligibility criterion"
lacks, as the Murry Court said, the necessary reasonable basis
since it's presumption often works contrary to fact.6 6 When better,
i.e., more precise tests of the ultimate (presumed) fact exist, a con-
62. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926). Accord, e.g., Vlan-
dis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
63. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1942).
64. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (bona fide resident
could not vote because durational residence requirement conclusively pre-
sumed nonresidence); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (administrative
hearing held before suspension of driver's license presumed fault because
driver uninsured without consideration of fact of fault); Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970) (bare possession of cocaine is insufficient predi-
cate for presuming distribution); Leary v. United States, 396 U.S. 6 (1969)
(possession of marijuana presumed knowledge that contraband was ille-
gally imported unless possession can be explained to jury); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (member of armed forces presumed nonresident
for voting purposes); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1942) (convicted
felon or fugitive from justice who possessed firearm presumed illegally in
possession of firearm shipped in interstate or foreign commerce); Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (if convicted of third
felony involving moral turpitude, presumed habitual felon and sterilized;
distinction made between intrinsically similar crimes, e.g. larceny and em-
bezzlement); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (gratuitous conveyance
presumed in contemplation of death for tax purposes even though grantor
killed by lightning within statutory period).
65. 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973).
66. Id.
elusive presumption is impermissible.67 The rules of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare require benefits under fed-
erally assisted programs to continue until there has been a hear-
ing on a change in a person's eligibility status.6 8 Previously, the
Court has held that a pretermination evidentiary hearing is a right
when the question of eligibility is raised under a state welfare pro-
gram.69 However, the Administrator of the Food and Nutrition
Service of the Department of Agriculture admitted that no bona
fide hearing was permitted: the procedure open to those declared
ineligible amounted to a questioning about the fact of tax dependent
status, and not the essential act of need.1 0 And as this procedure
does not involve facts going to the avowed purposes of the Act,
i.e., need, there was no hearing at all.
7 1
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the oppor-
tunity to be heard"7 2 is a premise so basic and well known as to
require no expansion. While it is the case that procedure is always
easier and cheaper than individualized determination, where
the facts are ignored in favor of administrative ease the presump-
tion can easily cause severe injury to legitimate interests. "  The
Court has stated more than once that "a statute creating a presump-
tion which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates
the due process clause. '74 For this reason, the Murry Court found
67. Cf. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349-53 (1972).
68. Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 944 (1971). Almenares dealt with the federal assistance program
known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10
(1970).
69. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, opinion supplemented, 397 U.S.
282 (1970); Hackney v. Mackado, 397 U.S. 593 (1970); Wheeler v. Montgom-
ery, 397 U.S. 280, opinion supplemented, 397 U.S. 282 (1970). For example,
the Court has ruled that a one year residency eligibility requirement is in-
vidiously discriminatory and denies the constitutional right to travel. Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See Grahm v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971) (durational residency requirement for aliens). See also Hughes,
Constitutional Limitations of Territorial Differences in Federal Food Assist-
ance, 4 SUFFOLK L. Rsv. 742, 746-59 (1967); Rosenheim, Shapiro v. Thomp-
son: "The Beggars are Coming to Town," THE SUPREME COURT REvIEw 303
(P. Kurland ed. 1969).
70. 413 U.S. 508, 512 (1973).
71. Id.
72. Stanley v. Illinois. 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972). Accord, e.g., Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971).
73. Grannis v. Ordeon, 234 U.S. 485, 494 (1914).
74. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932). Accord, Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973). In Vlandis, the Court ruled that where
a statute presumes for tuition purposes that residence at the time of appli-
cation to the state university system will be considered the residence of
the student for the entire span of attendance at the university, the lack
of opportunity to demonstrate bona fide residence is violative of due proc-
ess, as the legislative purpose was to have a lower tuition burden for resi-
dent students than for non-resident students. Similarly, an unwed father
who is presumed an unsuitable parent without opportunity to have a fitness
hearing and is thereby unable to have custody of his children when their
mother dies is denied due process since the purpose of the statute was to
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the "tax dependent status" eligibility criterion of the Food Stamp
Act in violation of the fifth amendment due process clause, and
declared it inapplicable.75 It should be noted that the fallibility
of the presumption alone is not the basis of the Court's decision:
rather it is the combination of fallibility and irrebuttability which
precipitates the result. Now that the holdings of the Court have
been presented, it is necessary to regard the respective dissenting
opinions"' in order to obtain a complete overview of the forces at
play in both Murry and Moreno. Although the cases deal with
different segments of the Food Stamp Act and are decided by dif-
ferent approaches under the fifth amendment due process clause,
the major premises of the dissents
7 7 are virtually isomorphic.
7 8
Superficially, it is not obvious why this should be so, nor why
the cases should be characterized as companions7" beyond the fact
that both cases deal with a portion of the Food Stamp Act. As al-
ready seen,80 the basis of the decision in Murry was an invalid ir-
rebuttable presumption. A presumption necessarily creates a clas-
sification,8 hence the dissenters address themselves to the question
of classification8 2 inherent in both cases.
ensure proper care for children of deceased unwed mothers. Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
75. 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973).
76. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 522 (1973) (Rehn-
quist, J., Burger, C.J., dissenting); U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508, 520 (1973) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); U.S. Dep't of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 405 U.S. 528, 545 (1973) (Rehnquist & Powell, J.J., Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). The discussion in the text centers about the dissents written
by Mr. Justice Rehnquist. Mr. Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the
Court's opinion in Moreno, was unpersuaded by the arguments of the Court
in Murry and took the same position he had in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 276 (1970): "This decision is thus only another variant of the view
often expressed by members of the Court that the Due Process Clause for-
bids any conduct that a majority of the Court believes 'unfair,' 'indecent'
or 'shocking to their conscience.' " U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508, 520-22 (1973) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. Henceforth the singular, 'dissent' will be used.
78. It is interesting to note that in spite of this characterization, Mr.
Justice Powell, who concurred in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Murry
was in the majority in Moreno. Why the change of position of both Mr.
Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Blackmun (note 76 supra) is curious can
be seen from the rest of the discussion of the dissent infra.
79. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 515 (1973).
80. See notes 53-56, 58-60, 70-71 and accompanying text supra.
81. It is obvious that the "unreasonableness" of a classification is ordi-
narily the symptom which a court dealing with a presumption cures when
(and if) the presumption is held invalid. In Murry, the appellees were
classified as non-needy (and hence ineligible) because of the operation of
the presumption found in 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1970).
82. The dissent is not alone in approaching the problem presented in
Murry in terms of classification: Mr. Justice Marshall, in his concurring
The main premise83 in the Moreno dissent is that Congress
does not have to be perfect, that is, there exists no constitutional
mandate that every piece of legislation be free from any problem
whatsoever. Legislation entails classification and as long as there
is a reasonable basis for the classification, some inequality does not
offend the Constitution:8 4 in other words "[t]he Constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the statute's objective."8 5 The dissent relies
opinion, studies the "analytic underpinnings of the Court's opinion" in terms
of classification by examining whether there is "similar treatment for those
similarly situated." 413 U.S. 508, 517 (1973). The problem is clearly defined
in that one class of needy persons (those with tax dependent status) is
receiving different treatment than all other needy persons. A "balancing
test" approach is used with respect to the classification engendered by 7
U.S.C. § 2014(b) to determine whether such categorical treatment is appro-
priate; the private interest affected is balanced against the interest the gov-
ernment seeks to protect. In the instant case, being denied a necessity of
life certainly outweighs easy obviation of fraud, especially since Congress
could easily structure a hearing procedure to prove eligibility, thereby curb-
ing abuses without affecting eligible households. For a brief history and
discussion of the balancing test, see 19 DE PAuL L. REv. 552 discussing Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See generally M. Fomnosca, CONsTrru-
TIONAL LAW 421-23 (2d ed. 1969).
The balancing test is ordinarily found in the equal protection arsenal,
and accordingly, Justice Marshall speaks in much the same tones as the
Moreno Court: although he does not explicitly advocate equal protection
as the grounds for the decision, he does make implicit reference to its appli-
cability admitting that his approach "combines elements traditionally in-
voked in what are normally treated as distinct classes of cases," viz. the
dichotomy of due process and equal protection. 412 U.S. 508, 519 (1973Y.
It should also be noted that Justice Marshall's point of departure is different
from that of the Court-the balancing test is employed to determine
whether a hearing is necessary. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 337
(1969). This is actually the converse of the Court's approach; instead of
approaching the statutory presumption directly, the operation of classifica-
tion without hearing is taken on. The result is the same, although attention
is focused on the classification created by the presumption, rather than the
presumption itself.
Justice Marshall's approach is relevant here for two reasons. It quietly
reinforces the Moreno Court's approach to federal classification via "quasi-
federal equal protection," and it concomitantly demonstrates that the dis-
sent does take an appropriate position with respect to the Murry decision.
The latter is important to the comparison of the Court's position in Murry
and Moreno with the dissent infra.
83. There appears to be a hidden premise within the Moreno dissent
which also was present in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Murry, i.e., it is
not the Court's purpose to act as super-legislator to either Congress or the
state legislatures in order to perfect legislation. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.
v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). Unless the legislation works invidious
discrimination, the Court should not use the Constitution to strike unwise
legislation: legislators are answerable to the people, and it is to the legisla-
ture the people must turn. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
488 (1955). Accord, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 384 (1971);
Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game of Washington, 391 U.S. 392, 402 (1968);
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 431
(1964); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
84. Lindsey v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). Ac-
cord, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
85. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1960). Accord, Rich-
ardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 84 (1971).
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upon Dandridge v. Williams,"8 a relatively recent welfare case, in
support of this position. Dandridge involved state administration of
a federal welfare program 7 where a maximum grant per family
per month was claimed invidiously discriminatory by the plaintiff
as large families received less per capita than smaller ones. The
Court denied this averment, saying that a classification should not
be struck down (i.e., there is no denial of equal protection in that
classification) merely because of the absence of "mathematical
nicety" and the presence of some inequality.88 It may be that
classifying all families larger than four in the same way affords
more or less money per person, but a "rough and ready" means of
proceeding may be adequate, if not necessary to accomplish the
legislature's goal.89
This same logic has been applied to federal welfare as well
as state welfare: Richardson v. Belcher,0 which has been charac-
terized as the extension of Dandridge to federal law9' held that
if a federal statute's classification meets the"Dandridge test,"
i.e., is "rationally based and free from invidious discrimination,
'92
then it is consistent with the due process requirement of the fifth
amendment. 93 The Richardson Court felt that the way to deter-
mine the existence of a rational basis was to decipher the legisla-
tive intent by looking at the legislative history of the statute.
4
The dissent in Moreno regarded the legislative intent behind the
Food Stamp Act so as to buttress it's position.8 9 They stated:
The limitation which Congress enacted could . . . conceiv-
ably deny food stamps to members of households which
have been formed solely for the purpose of taking advan-
tage of the food stamp program. Since the food stamp
program is not intended to be a subsidy for every individ-
ual who desires low cost food, this was a permissible con-
gressional decision quite consistent with the underlying
policy of the Act.9 6
The dissent "conceived of a state of facts which reasonably justify
86. 397 U.S. 471 (1970), rehearing denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970).
87. Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10
(1970).
88. 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The Court in Moreno "concedes" this
point. See 413 U.S. 528, 546 (1973).
89. 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
90. 404 U.S. 78 (1971).
91. Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
93. 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971).
94. 404 U.S. 78, 82 (1971).
95. The legislative intent in question is discussed in notes 17-18 and
accompanying text supra.
96. 413 U.S. 508, 547 (1973).
the classification" 97 and summarily concluded that the classifica-
tion should have been sustained.
The dissent's treatment of Murry is more elaborate. In the
first argument, the existence of a conclusive presumption is denied
and a distinction made between a presumption which concludes
factual matters and a pure limitation on spending intended to cure
systematic abuses.98 This argument is short and inconclusive,
amounting to a statement that Congress moved to curb abuses
and did so by eliminating a certain class of persons. While there is
indeed a "qualitative difference" between an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of fact lacking due process and a limitation on fund ex-
penditures, the former is a manner of denial, the latter is the fact
,of denial. The dissent does not discuss the method chosen to enact
the limitation.
The second argument 99 takes the following course: even though
the classification may operate to deny needy victims of fraudulent
tax claims, Congress may assume that taxpayers will obey the law
and procced w -M"wui. iiiaanug wiuowa.ces for duIauuers. Llaining
someone as a tax dependent entails being willing and able to support
him (and presumably actually supporting him) in accordance with
The Internal Revenue Code.10 0 Moreover, as there exists some corre-
lation between being a dependent and having income exceeding the
limits of participation in the Food Stamp Program, the provision
is not irrational. 10 1 This second argument does not address itself to
the basis of the Court's decision, viz. irrebuttable presumptions.
But it does address the classification created by the presumption
by denying that the classification is based upon any arbitrary or ca-
pricious act by Congress. If the classification itself is proper, it
follows that the device used to classify is of little significance as no
invidious discrimination has occurred. If this reasoning is ac-
cepted, the question of lack of due process never arises for there
would not be a lack of due process where there is no infringe-
ment upon any person's rights.
In both Moreno and Murry, the Court as a whole is firmly
polarized, neither side lending credence to the arguments of the
other. Callousness is not the source of difference in attitude, nor
does the explanation for this split appear to have it's foundation
in hard and fast principles of law, for there is agreement that arbi-
trary or invidious discrimination fostered by a classification (and
the statute which generates it) is necessarily void. 0 2 Instead, the
97. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1960).
98. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 522-24 (1973).
99. Id. at 525-26.
100. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
101. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
102. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 428, (majority &
dissent) (1973); U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, (ma-
jority & dissent) (1973).
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split appears to be engendered by conflicting approaches to the
problem of classification. The two sides might be caricatured as
the "pragmatists" (legislation need not be perfect so long as there
exists a reasonable basis for the classification, i.e., the dissent) and
the "idealists" (any discrimination is exemplary of invidious legis-
lation, i.e., the majority of the Court). These labels do not of
course apply to any individual member of the Court.103 The di-
chotomy itself is not new. 04 It appears frequently, in many di-
verse situations where the question at hand involves classifica-
tion.10 1 However, there is no way of analytically scrutinizing a
fact situation and predicting what the probable outcome would be.
The fundamental difference between "pragmatist" and "idealist"
outlooks affords no prophesy else than a promise that it will surely
continue.
The Moreno and Murry decisions do not approach being "land-
marks," and while both are majority decisions,0 6 there are strong
dissents in both, which affects their weight as authority. Nonethe-
less, the propositions represented by these cases are significant, con-
tributing to the ever developing field of due process. There is no
doubt but that the perimeter of due process is not susceptible to
103. The result of a random individual's determination of whether a
classification is invidiously discriminatory would surely depend upon his
basic outlook: would he agree with Chief Justice Holmes that "[W] e must
remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were
not allowed a little play in its joints," or must a classification work without
harming even one person? Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501
(1931).
104. See, e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S.
459 (1937).
105. A good example is Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), re-
hearing denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970); the Court ("pragmatists") found that
the statutory limit on welfare payments irrespective of family size was not
discriminatory, while the dissenters ("idealists") argued that same classifi-
cation (in terms of benefits receivable) as overinclusive and hence discrim-
inatory against large families. The dichotomy, which with respect to the
identical facts, is inexplicable, except perhaps in terms of that ancient
aphorism, "reasonable men can differ." As a brief illustration of the fre-
quent appearance of this split, there are at least the following cases since
1970: Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973); N.J. Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619
(1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 411 U.S. 913 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970).
106. Both decisions are split. In Moreno, six justices concur in the
Court's opinion, one concurs only in the Court's result, and two dissent.
In Murry, six Justices concur in the Court's opinion (there are also two
supplemental opinions), and three dissent (in two dissenting opinions).
See note 76 supra.
precise demarcation: it may even be impossible to accurately chart
the true bounds of due process. 10 7 But there are distinct subcate-
gories of this field of law into which Moreno and Murry may be
placed as contributing authority. Moreno takes its place in two
areas. First, and unsurprisingly, it requires federal welfare legis-
lation to be free from invidious discrimination. Alone, this propo-
sition merely reasserts the fundamental demand that federal legis-
lation conform to fifth amendment due process requirements and
applies that demand to federal welfare programs. However, the
Court used fourteenth amendment analysis to arrive at a fifth
amendment decision, and herein lies the importance of Moreno.
While asserting that even though there be no explicit equal protec-
tion under the fifth amendment, the Court obtains an equal protec-
tion result by finding a violation of substantive due process. 08
Strictly, Moreno is not authority for the proposition that there is
fifth amendment equal protection, but it does present a way to get
an analogous result. Further, should the Court ever have to rule
whether or not an. explicit -qua protection compo nent exiJsts un-
der the fifth amendment, Moreno will be available as a paradigm
of federal equal protection' 9 which may be used to support the
existence of that component.
The perspective from which Murry should be viewed is the
recent flurry of activity in applying procedural due process re-
quirements to diverse areas. Wage garnishment,"10 summary rep-
levin,' confession of judgment,112 and termination of state welfare
receipts118 have all of them been the subject of a recent decision
wherein the question of violation of procedural due process was
raised. The Court in Murry did not hold that a hearing was neces-
sary, but instead intimated that if the eligibility criterion of "in-
come tax dependent status" is to be kept by Congress, a meaning-
ful hearing will have to be provided. In ruling that an irrebutta-
ble presumption was invalid because it clearly works contrary to
fact 1 4 the Murry Court has implicitly reiterated that the fundamen-
tal right to be heard may not be abrogated if any questions as to
the facts exist."'
107. Hoden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898).
108. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supram
109. See note 48 supra.
110. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 397 (1969). See, e.g.,
77 DicK. L. REv. 197 (1972).
111. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
112. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
113. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, opinion supplemented, 397 U.S.
282 (1970).
114. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973).
115. "A fundamental requisite of due process is 'the opportunity to be
heard. . . .' It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Monzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965). Accord, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
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There was no ruling in either case that pretermination eviden-
tiary hearings are necessary under federal welfare programs, since
the question of hearings never really arises: the cases do not deal
with the manner of termination, but go to the fact of ineligibility
and the lack of due process therein. Thus, it would be superfluous
to determine whether procedurally a person was properly declared
ineligible when the eligibility standard itself had been held void for
substantive reasons.
Whether or not a declaration of the necessity of pretermina-
tion hearing would have been dictum in Moreno and Murry, it is
but a short step to that declaration now. Federal welfare legisla-
tion has been explicitly proclaimed as subject to the due process
requirements of the fifth amendment.116 While this may always
have been analytically true, it now has become manifest. When the
procedural mechanics of termination under any of the federal wel-
fare programs (which do not already require a meaningful hear-
ing) come into question, Moreno and Murry can be used to place
those mechanics squarely under the fifth amendment. At that
time, an analogy to the pretermination requirement in state
programs" 7 would be valid. When the question arises, should the
Court wish to require a pretermination evidentiary hearing as a
matter of right before termination of any federal welfare assist-
ance, Moreno and Murry will be among the foundational materials
used in arriving at that momentous decision.
CHAmRLES R. Onwyo
116. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973); U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 513 (1973).
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